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THERE ARE NO DOGMATA, LAWS, RULES OR STANDARDS
IN THE SCIENCE OE ECONOMICS
by William E. Becker*
Abstract
As with other sciences, the author argues that there are no unquestionable ideas in economics, and
attempts to impose "No Child Left Behind" K-12 type "technical standards" in universities will turn
higher education in economics into remedial education. Students need to learn that the very nature of a
science is to have unresolved topics and an on-going scrutiny of theories no matter how steeped they are
in tradition. He provides examples to show how the dumbing down of economics to the dogmatic
preaching of a few simple concepts, principles, and axioms of old misses the excitement of modem day
economics and is a deceitful representation of the science of economics and a disservice to students
seeking a higher education.
I. Introduction
The "No Child Left Behind" K-12 education ini-
tiative is associated with The National Assessment
of Educational Progress (NAEP). The NAEP Eco-
nomics Eramework project website http://www.
naepecon2006.org/projoverview.asp states that its
advisory panel "assures that the assessment specifi-
cations meet recognized technical standards." This
pre-college thinking has permeated advice on the
teaching of economics at the post-secondary levels:
Here we offer a strategy for refocusing the
Principles course on economic literacy . . .
The Voluntary National Content Standards in
Economics are the building blocks of our
Principles course. The 20 Standards provide
an operational definition of economic literacy
. . . the core of economic knowledge and
descriptions explaining what students should
be able to do with that knowledge. (Hansen,
Salemi and Siegfried, 2002, 464.)
But there are no standards in the science of eco-
nomics. I will argue here, as I have elsewhere, that
other than a need for honesty there are no rules.
laws or dogmata in economics and attempts to
impose K-12 thinking in higher education will, to
paraphrase Veblen, render university faculties to be
nothing more than high school teachers masquerad-
ing as something much greater.' Doing in universi-
ties what is arguably legitimate for high schools is
remedial education (or training) and not higher edu-
cation.
II. Controversies in Science
One might assert that if economics is truly a sci-
ence then like other sciences it must have a core of
non-controversial principles that stand the test of
time. Even without knowing much if anything about
other sciences, however, academic economists
should be aware of heated debates in the natural sci-
ences from reading the Waii Street Journal and like
media sources readily available to them. Eor
instance, WSJ articles by Begley (2005a; 2005b)
detail such controversy. MIT's Erank Wilczek (who
shared the 2004 Nobel Prize in physics) is quoted
by Begley saying that some alleged laws of physics
are rightfully disputed, giving as an example the
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concept that mass is conserved, a staple from intro-
ductory courses. Wilczek is quoted saying "But that
couldn't be more wrong. Massive particles such as
protons are built of quarks and gluons, which have
zero mass (unless they are moving). Mass is far
from conserved." Erom high school physics we
learn that for every action there is an equal and
opposite reaction; yet, Wilczek is quoted by Begley
saying that is not universally true: "It fails for mag-
netic forces between charged particles."
Begley tells of high school biology teachers pre-
senting without question that auxin promotes plant
growth, when the reality is far more complex as
seen in the raging controversy over how, if at all, it
does so. She reports that only recently did Indiana
University's Mark Estelle and colleagues find that
auxin attracts and binds plant proteins that silence
growth-promoting genes. It is the enzymes that then
devour the silencers that allow growth genes to turn
on. Astronomers argue over the dark matter that
pervades the universe. Thus, an up-to-date textbook
should state that dark matter exists but its composi-
tion remains an enigma. Begiey's examples of con-
troversy in the natural sciences that are not being
taught in introductory science classes go on and on
but can be summarized with the quote from physi-
cist Lawrence Kraus of Case Western Reserve:
"Every scientific theory is constantly under scrutiny
and has unknowns at the edges."^
III. Looking Back
The idea that students need a sense of the historic
development and mastery of basic concepts in a sci-
ence to be literate in the science was dismissed by
Richard Eeynman (co-recipient of the Nobel Prize
in Physics in 1965, and at the time a faculty mem-
ber at the California Institute of Technology) when
he was asked to teach Caltech's undergraduate 2-
year introductory course in physics (Gleick, 1992).
Before Eeynman, the normal introductory universi-
ty physics courses went through the historic basic
concepts reaching atoms and molecules in the final
weeks. Eeynman, however, gave short shrift to
physics before the 1920s going right to quantum
physics in his second lecture, which at the time was
the sexy stuff that students could get excited about.
Over 40 years ago economists, such as the late
G. L. Bach, who was then Chair of the American
Economic Association's Committee on Economic
Education, championed the idea of emphasizing a
few basic economic concepts in the hopes that stu-
dents would at least retain something (although his
principles textbook was encyclopedic). The late
Ben Lewis, also a chair of the AEA Committee on
Economic Educadon, bemoaned the fact that his
beloved short list of economics laws was being
eschewed by mathematical innovations in the rapid-
ly advancing science of economics. He lamented:
Ours was an economy of principles, law and
order. The Law of Self-interest and the Law of
Supply and Demand governed our microcon-
cems, and our macroconcerns were few and
slight. Say's Law insured us against anything
more troublesome than exceptional... money
was kept in order by Gresham's Law. No one
dreamed of questioning the constitutionality
of our laws . . . The Depression opened the
door . . . through the open portal came a cou-
ple of mathemadcians. They stayed to dinner.
They, too, were movers—they moved in . . .
my old world was gone; economics began its
frantic scramble for recognition as an exact
science." (1970, 6-7)
To heed the advice of those who continue to
advance the doctrinaire teaching of concepts such
as opportunity cost and comparative advantage,
self-interest and incendves, supply and demand,
marginal costs and benefits and the like, with little
or no discussion and quesdoning of the conditions
required for their use in analysis and ignoring inno-
vadons in economics are giant steps backward in
the teaching of economics.
If for no reason other than the dme constraint, to
say nothing of learning theory, classes in any sub-
ject cannot be encyclopedic. The number of con-
cepts to be taught must be limited by the amount of
dme available for learning. This observadon, how-
ever, does not imply that a short list of outdated
concepts be emphasized to the exclusion of more
appropriate alternadves. Eor example Victor Euchs
(2004) tells of his use of the case method in the
1950s and how he came to believe that in teaching
his philosophy is captured by the aphorisms of "less
is more" and "there is no teaching, only learning,"
which 50 years later are two views that are still
being advanced by many in the economic education
movement as novel. But unlike many of the current
advocates of the "less is more" philosophy, Euchs
calls attention to the limitations of economics and
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the need for honesty in spelling out the shortcom-
ings of economic analysis. Similarly, eminent econ-
omist and textbook author Edmond Malinvaud
(2004) warns teachers of economics to avoid a set
of dogmadc and typically invalid methods of old
and the misuse of so-called stylized facts as if they
were empirically valid. There must be real empiri-
cal support for the analysis we advance in the class-
room or students will rightfully dismiss us as
dreamers or, worse yet, frauds.
IV. Outdated and Misused Ideas
During an office interview of a newly minted
Ph.D. candidate for an entry-level professorship, I
asked her to relate the ideas of equilibria in eco-
nomics science to what students see in the popular
press. She paused and said, "Well, supply and
demand . . . " I asked how she would respond to
sadrist P. J. O'Rourke's assertion (in Eat the Rich:
A Treatise on Economics, 1999) that textbook sup-
ply and demand graphs do not help much in ana-
lyzing situations that are found in newspaper head-
lines? I did not get much of an answer.
I was equally bemused by a viewer chiding
provocadve TV Talk show host Bill O'Reilly (Octo-
ber 10, 2005) for going after the energy companies
for "gouging," saying he should understand com-
petitive free markets because he surely used supply
and demand to negodate his compensation package
on the EOX network.' He responded that Enron
demonstrates how markets can be manipulated and
that he actually took a lower salary to be with EOX.
A recent house guest who teaches masses of
introductory students berated me for maintaining a
lawnmower and cutting my own grass because my
comparadve advantage lay elsewhere. He called my
attention to an example in Gregory Mankiw's
(1998) textbook in which a hypothedcal quesdon is
raised as to whether highly paid basketball star
Michael Jordan should cut his own grass, at an
alleged opportunity cost of $10,000, given that a
neighbor girl can be hired at $20. My house guest
did not appreciate my calling his attention to the
enjoyment I and possibly Jordan get from cutdng
grass, not being dependent on others, and muld-
tasking (joint producdon of physical condidoning
and grass cutting—one minute walking behind the
lawnmower is one less minute on a treadmill)."
Curiously, Gary Becker's 1992 Nobel Prize win-
ning work on productive consumpdon (activides
that enhance both utility and wealth) was ignored
by Mankiw and my academic economist house
guest.
Is it really true that many of the things of interest
to students and things that they see and hear in the
popular media lend themselves to supply and
demand analysis, comparadve advantage assess-
ment, and like ideas that are advanced as the
bedrock of introductory classes? Is one really eco-
nomically literate if he or she has mastered the
rhetoric of outdated textbook economics? Given
modern advances in the science of economics, liter-
acy today implies that a student confronted with an
applicadon of a supposedly immutable principle
can ardculate why the underpinning key assump-
dons are likely not met in the real world. Students
who are literate in economics should be able to rec-
ognize that there are no "principles of economics"
in the sense of basic truths in economics. The prin-
ciples that economists think they are teaching are in
fact theories underpinned far too often with
assumptions that are unlikely to be met in actual cir-
cumstances and which when blindly applied give
erroneous results.
Eor example, when imperfect informadon leads
to the use of price as a measure of quality—as in
used-car markets, insurance, and labor markets—
then an equilibrium may be characterized by
inequality between quanddes demanded and sup-
plied, and a neat separation of demand and supply
curves may not be appropriate. Scarcity of concert
tickets may actually increase their attractiveness
making stadc demand curve analysis meaningless.
Similarly, supply and demand curves are arguably
unidendfiable in the case of medical and legal ser-
vices.
The traditional competitive model of the Arrow
and Debreu variety is based on a collection of iden-
tical items. If one tries to define a market for an
individual, such as that for Bill O'Reilly, then it is
not a compedtive market. Saying that the relevant
object is not the individual TV personality Bill
O'Reilly but all such talk show hosts implies com-
petition but all talk show hosts cannot be treated as
homogeneous as in a compedtive market. As Joseph
Sdglitz (1987) wrote some 20 years ago, we need to
articulate the
. . . difference between economies in which
the law of supply and demand is repealed and
those where it still holds . . . markets in which
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commodities are completely homogenous—
with respect to locadon and the date as well as
other characteristics—are almost inherently
sufficiently thin so that the postulate of per-
fect competidon is inapplicable. Markets that
are sufficiently 'thick' to be competidve are
almost always nonhomogeneous.(25)
Using the textbook supply and demand graphs,
an instructor will have problems correctly guiding a
student who comes in with a quote such as this from
Michael ColUns, a retail partner at Bain & Co. in
Chicago:
Making the 1,000th DVD player is a lot more
efficient and less expensive than making the
first, and that's reflected in the lower price.
The difference between the manufacturing
cost of the 1 millionth and the 2 millionth is
miniscule. (El Boghdady and Musgrove,
2003, E2)
Traditional discussions of supply curves are prob-
lemadc when marginal costs are approximately
zero, as is the case for many informadon-based
goods with which students are familiar. The idend-
fication of supply and demand shifts are further
complicated when demand for a product depends in
part on its widespread usage. The idea that a fall in
the price of capital relative to the price of labor
necessitates a shift out of labor and into capital was
refuted by the Cambridge controversy when the
entire nodon that capital (or labor) could be treated
as homogenous was contested.
Students do need to learn about supply and
demand, but they also need confirmadon that text-
book-style competitive markets with demand and
supply curves that might work for agricultural com-
modities, at least in an idealized world, do not work
for all items of interest to them. Students need to
see situations in which increasing or decreasing a
price does not automadcally imply higher or lower
profits, but they don't need to spend hours calculat-
ing meaningless elasticides. They need to know
about the principle of comparative advantage, but
they also need to learn the difference between stat-
ic and dynamic analyses' and learn how risk is
defined and reduced through diversificadon, not
specialization.^ Students recognize that there is sat-
isfaction in doing things oneself and that behavior
toward risk must enter decisions—we are not all nor
are we always risk neutral, risk adverse or risk lov-
ing. Thus, how can instructors expect students to
ignore these things when they are given rigid muld-
ple-choice tests on overly simplisdc and outdated
economic concepts?'
V. Standards
Any professor of economics can idendfy the
field's tradidonal basic concepts. The trick is to rec-
ognize and articulate the shortcomings of simplisdc
analysis before students righdy dismiss it as irrele-
vant and then wrongly dismiss all of economics
with it.
Bright and modvated students will view stan-
dards that are based on out-dated ideas and inap-
propriate methods of analysis, no matter how hard
and complex, as dismal. Eor instance, the driver's
test administered by Britain's Driving Standards
Agency is regarded as one of the hardest in the
world. Only 44 percent of takers pass, compared
with 79 percent in Germany and 61 percent in New
York State; yet, 20 percent of those passing the
Bridsh test have accidents within a year of passing
(Calian and Stecklow, 2002). This test is mocked as
outdated, remaining relatively unchanged since the
1920s—correct acdons include: using the hand
break to bring the car to a stop; being able to back
around a comer and up one block next to a curb
without touching the curb; never crossing hands
when turning the steering wheel; looking in the
review mirror before activadng the tum signals; etc.
Within the United States, the claim is made that
state law and medical exams have become dated as
seen in the Califomia exam where more than 50
percent of the state law exam takers fail, including
Stanford Law School Dean Kathleen Sullivan,
(Bandler and Koppel 2005).
As stated in Becker, Greene and Rosen (1990),
some basic skills may have a high value at one point
in dme and little value at another; for example, the
Polish cavalry was revered as highly skilled and
unmatched in discipline and high standards, howev-
er, that tradidon of excellence came to a tragic end
when confronted with the German tank. As with
cavalry skills, paper and pencil long division was
trumped by an ability to manipulate a slide rule,
which fell in value with the availability of the inex-
pensive hand calculator; the ability to work the
hand-held calculator fell in value with the advance-
ment of computer spreadsheets and stadsdcal pack-
ages. Since wridng with Greene and Rosen, the
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development of online search engines has made
library card catalog skills obsolete.
So, too, in economics: skills, ideas and informa-
tion become dated. The advent of the modem-day
computer, for instance, has tumed economics into a
more empirical subject, as seen in the work of
recent recipients of the Nobel Memorial Prize in
Economic Science. Yet, the typical undergraduate
curriculum gives little attention to the importance of
empirical research and empirical findings. For
instance, standard textbook demand and supply
analysis is presented as religious dogma to show
that minimum wages destroy jobs; yet, empirical
evidence by Card and Krueger (1997) has stirred
debate about the accuracy of this widely accepted
theoretical assertion. Even Levitt and Dubner's
(2005) research behind the pop-culture book
Freakonomics is data driven with ideas that are at
the frontier of economics and not at all in keeping
with standard textbook presentations.
Innovations in the science of economics are not
making their way into the teaching of economics at
the undergraduate level. For example, although
Nobel prizes are typically awarded for work com-
pleted years earlier, and Zahka (1999) described
how the Nobel Laureates' acceptance speeches can
be used in teaching the principles of economics, as
I report in Becker and Greene (2004) the work of
Nobel Laureates is rarely presented regularly in
principles textbooks prior to announcement of the
award and even seldom afterward.
Although major empirical findings and related
debates are regularly reported in the popular press
they are not featured in introductory textbooks.
Instead what we are beginning to see is a trend
toward the presentation of stylized facts, employed
to give the appearance of empiricism. True academ-
ic debate, such as that between Harvard's Caroline
Hoxby and Princeton's Jesse Rothstein over
Hoxby's empirical assessment of the importance of
school competition, was sufficiently important to
make it onto the front page of the Wall Street Jour-
nal (October 24, 2005) but somehow is not appro-
priate to be menfioned in textbooks.
A learned professor with refined (or yellowed)
classroom notes might argue that current theoretical
works and empirical methods of investigation are
beyond the grasp of the typical 18- to 22-year old.
However, students are aware of the idea of the com-
plex dynamics of chaos theory from movies such as
the schizophrenic thriller "-TT," where Max says, "If
you graph the numbers of any system, patterns
emerge; therefore, there are patterns everywhere in
nature . . . So what about the stock market? A uni-
verse of numbers that represents the global econo-
my . . ." A similar theme appears in Tom Stoppard's
play, Arcadia. An anthology by Watts (2003) pro-
vides nearly a hundred passages from both classic
and contemporary literature and drama dealing with
a wide range of economic concepts and issues. Con-
temporary movies like "IT" and plays like Arcadia
can engage the general movie and theater-going
population with current economic ideas.
For example, following the showing of Max's
clip from "IT," macroeconomics students who have
had some exposure to probability theory can be
challenged by Mathews' (2000, pp. 242-246) "urn
activities" to show the "Polyaprocess" in which
multiple equilibria result from a stochastic time
process involving the sequential drawing and
replacing of balls based on a stochastic decision
rule. Mathews (2001) places the importance of this
classroom experiment in an economic context
through examples drawn from history.
Leamed professors accustomed to only chalk
and talk teaching methods might also ague that the
idea of a Pareto equilibrium is a theoretical concept
not to be observed in the real world. But, again,
tuming to the movies, consider the blonde-in-the-
bar clip from "A Beautiful Mind." I have used this
clip as a motivational tool to establish the connec-
tion between Adam Smith's invisible hand and John
Nash's recognition of the role of cooperation with
heterogeneous student bodies consisting of both
entry-level university students and advanced gradu-
ate students.' I sandwich this clip between Charles
Holt's (1996) trading-pit simulation (in which a
Smithian equilibrium results from students pursu-
ing their individual self-interest as demanders and
suppliers) and Pickhardt's (2005) extension of Holt
and Laury's (1997) classroom simulation in which
a less than optimum non-cooperative equilibrium
tends to dominate a Nash cooperative equilibrium,
which is the Pareto optimum.
VI. Textbooks
Colander (2004) tells how he entered into text-
book writing with an ambition to change the way
economics is taught, with among other things an
emphasis on complexity and dynamic processes. To
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market books he describes how he was led by
reviewers and editors to follow the standard static
framework of market clearing prices and AS/AD.
He stated that instructors must recognize that text-
books do not represent what the author knows or
believes:
a text(book) is not a direct expression of what
the author believes, but instead a combination
of a much more complicated set of considera-
tions in which inertia and processes, not intel-
lectual or even pedagogical validity, play the
central roles . . . users of the books should be
aware that that's what principles of economics
textbooks are, and structure their teaching
accordingly, adding context to the discussion
whenever possible. (39)
Although some textbook authors and their pub-
lishers may be pandering to the remedial approach
of many college introductory courses that are taught
as secondary-school courses masquerading as much
more, it is refreshing to read how Carolyn Shaw
Bell (2004) responded in her early days of teaching
at Wellesley College when she was assigned to a
consumer economics course for which she found
the requisite content dreadful. Instead of taking the
easy road and going along with material in the text-
books of the day, she "refused to admit this body of
prejudice, misinformation and ninth-grade arith-
metic into my field of economics," and began an
inquiry into the subject that has lasted over 20
years. This defiance is yet another illustration of
how students in institutions of higher education
benefit from having a research-oriented economist
teach an introductory class versus a docent who can
only parrot what is in the textbook or on some stan-
dardized multiple-choice test. It is the instructor's
job to bring his or her students current thinking and
up-to-date debate going on in the science of eco-
nomics.
Many intermediate and advanced economics
textbook authors present without question the tenets
of expected utility theory, even though the work of
Nobel Laureate Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tver-
sky demonstrates that decision-makers have trouble
with the concept of probability and the valuation of
expected gains and losses.' The Allais paradox
(which is named after Maurice Allais, the 1988
Nobel Prize in economics recipient) can be used to
demonstrate the trouble people have ordering
uncertain prospects in a way that is independent of
irrelevant alternatives—a critical postulate for von
Neumann and Morgenstern's expected utility theo-
ry.'"
One of the insights that Kahneman and Tversky
had was that choice problems are usually described
in terms of gains and losses, but the utility functions
that were supposed to explain the choices were
defined in terms of absolute levels. Similar to Harry
Markowitz, who won the Nobel Prize in economics
in 1990, they decided to adopt changes and/or dif-
ferences as the sources of utility, which provided
the foundation for their "prospect theory," as used
in "behavioral economics" today. Prospect theory
replaces the notion of "utility" with "value," which
is defined in terms of gains and losses as deviations
from a reference point. The value function for loss-
es is convex and relatively steep, but for gains, it is
concave and not quite so steep. In addition, Kahne-
man and Tversky replaced the probability factor for
each preference with a subjective "decision weight"
that tends to overweight small probabilities and
underweight moderate and high probabilities."
I hear instructors employing traditional textbook
economics saying: "students will not understand
these calculations!" To those instructors, I ask: what
do you think they are teaching in psychology?
. Enough Is Enough!
Becker and Greene (2004) give numerous other
ways in which the contributions of the Nobel Lau-
reates in economics can be used to bring more cur-
rent thinking into the classroom so I will stop with
those examples here. An instructor does not have to
endorse dynamic analysis, complexity, prospect
theory, the more general theories of bounded ratio-
nality, or delve into the intricacies of probability
theory in decision-making, but those teaching eco-
nomics today can no longer ignore this work even if
the textbooks do. Students are no longer confined to
what is in textbooks. The Internet provides them
with up-to-date data, headhnes, commentary and
academics' views on the economy and current
events.'^
I am not calling for anything like Nobel Laureate
Richard Feynman's dismissal of pre-1920 ideas in
his teaching introductory physics. Students need to
know the historic rhetoric of economics to commu-
nicate in economics, but that level of understanding
does not require an unquestioning belief that those
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concepts can be widely applied in situations where
research suggests that they come up short. As
reflected in the work of the Nobel Laureates in eco-
nomics and other well recognized modern day
economists, much has been leamed to amend, clar-
ify and in some cases replace ideas of old. The
process of modifying and replacing the old with the
new involves argument and debate. It is con-
tentious.
An economist might rightfully ask why academ-
ic economists are not already bringing controversy
into their classrooms, if it is desired? In the case of
probability and decision-making, Christopher Sims
(2001, p. 53) states that few economists have been
taught—and thus they have not given thought to—
the differences and similarities among different def-
initions of probability, chance and risk and how
people behave when confronted with ambiguity and
uncertainty. In the case of teaching techniques
appropriate for showing controversy, it may be that
academic economists do not know what activities 2.
are available to teach these new ideas, since they
have never seen them in practice in the teaching of
economics. As Gail Hoyt (2003) states, possibly
academic economists have not embraced these new
ideas and teaching methods because they are expe-
rience goods: anticipated high start-up costs keep
risk-averse economists from trying them. Finally, it
might be that less-than-secure instructors are fearful
of end-of-term student evaluations.'^
Regardless of the reason for lack of innovation in
teaching, ideas in the science of economics, no mat-
ter how entrenched, must be questioned in a class-
room devoted to higher learning. As with other sci-
ences, there are no divinely sanctioned laws that are
beyond question. Students need to learn that the
very nature of a science is to have unresolved topics
and an on-going scrutiny of theories no matter how
steeped they are in tradition. The dumbing down of
economics to the dogmatic preaching of a few sim-
ple concepts, principles, and axioms of old misses
the excitement of modern day economics and is a
deceitful representation of the science of economics
and a disservice to students seeking a higher educa-
tion.
Notes
1. Some might think that 1 am making a mountain
out of a molehill in arguing that there are those
in positions of authority who would like to see
higher education become more like high school
education. But, as chairman of the Board of
Regents of the University of Texas System
Board of Regents, business executive Charles
Miller introduced system-wide testing of col-
lege students, similar to the high-stakes testing
used in public schools. Miller is credited with
being a driving force behind the Texas public-
school accountability system that is based on
standardized tests and which became the
national education model for the George Bush
administration, Jayson (2005, 8D). In 2005,
Miller was selected by Margaret Spellings,
U.S. Secretary of Education, to head the newly
formed Commission on Higher Education, with
the expectation that his committee would rec-
ommend testing of college students similar to
that being implemented in the University of
Texas System, Field (2006).
Becker and Andrews (2004) provide examples
to show that higher education involves much
more than the teaching of traditional doctrine.
It is the academic inquiry that elevates higher
education above mere training. They argue that
at a research university instruction has the
potential to be enhanced because it can be
made a part of an integrated and aggressive
campaign of inquiry. Active researchers can
engage students in the challenging ideas, ques-
tions and methods of inquiry at the forefront of
their disciplines, whereas docents can be
expected only to teach that which they have
been taught or learned from textbooks. They
call attention to the fact that research is expen-
sive and that public community colleges with
no research mission have thrived under the
belief that a faculty devoted to research is not
essential to performing the less-expensive
teaching function. A contextual updating of
Gresham's law (inferior currency drives out
superior currency) might suggest that the less
expensive educational practices of community
colleges will force out the more expensive full-
time, tenured faculty members teaching at the
research universities. As Becker and Andrews
demonstrate, there is evidence of this happen-
ing with both public research and doctoral
institutions increasing the proportions of both
part-time and full-time faculty members with
non-tenure track appointments. Following the
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community college model, universities are
increasingly looking to part-time and non-
tenure track docent-type appointments to teach
in undergraduate baccalaureate programs.
Unfortunately, Gresham's law in this context is
just as deficient in assessing effects as it is for
monetary policy.
3. The idea (or law) that the demand and supply
functions can be isolated to show how changes
lead to a competitive equilibria (in which the
quantities demanded and supplied are necessar-
ily equated in textbook fashion) is so simplistic
that there is an old joke about training (not edu-
cating) a parrot to be an economist by teaching
it to repeat two words "demand" and "supply."
4. A few of years ago I presented a version of
Becker (1979) in which the shadow prices of
teaching, research and leisure were derived to 5.
be a function of several parameters in joint pro-
duction processes with no simple tradeoff
between teaching and research. After the pre-
sentation someone who taught introductory and
intermediate economics asked, "why didn't you
consider the opportunity costs of teaching and
research?" Ferraro and Taylor (2005) report on
economists attending the Allied Social Science
Association meetings not being able to correct-
ly identify the opportunity cost in the following
hypothetical situation:
You won a free ticket to see an Eric Clapton
concert (which has no resale value). Bob
Dylan is performing on the same night and is
your next-best alternative activity. Tickets to
see Dylan cost $40. On any given day, you
would be willing to pay up to $50 to see
Dylan. Assume there are no other costs of see-
ing either performer. Based on this informa-
tion, what is the opportunity cost of seeing
Eric Clapton?
o.
They conclude that although the concept of
opportunity cost is covered in the first week of
an introductory undergraduate course, it is
incorrectly deemed to be so straightforward as
to not require further teaching time. They also
observe that it is not contained in graduate text-
books and clearly should be. They quote a sur-
vey responder from a top-20 Ph.D. economics
program saying: "When would I have leamed 7.
the concept of opportunity cost? I don't remem-
ber hearing that word used in graduate school."
Could it be that the old idea of opportunity cost
is too simplistic to have any true meaning in
real decision making? Could it be that the sci-
ence of economics has moved beyond this sim-
plistic bivariate relative pricing idea? Could it
be that graduate textbooks, as in my presenta-
tion on the shadow prices of teaching and
research, have correctly given up on the intro-
ductory economics course idea of an opportu-
nity cost in favor of more useful measures of
price? Alternatively, why is there such a divide
between undergraduate and graduate education
in economics? Could it be that those at the fore-
front of research in economics and teaching in
prestigious graduate programs are misleading
their students? These are not rhetorical ques-
tions—I seriously do not have the answers.
David Ricardo advanced the idea of compara-
tive advantage some 200 years ago. It requires
that the production technologies and resources
of the trading partners remain in place—for
example, one parcel of land is fixed and owned
by one country and another piece of land is
fixed and owned by another country. Unlike cli-
mate and geography, in today's world both cap-
ital and technology are not fixed; they quickly
can be moved from one country to another. As
a result, even if the U.S. has an advantage in the
electronic processing of insurance forms today,
that technology (as well as related technologies
as we have seen) can quickly be moved to India
for even greater cost savings. To say that the
U.S. has a comparative advantage in processing
forms requires the assumption that this technol-
ogy is fixed to the U.S., which students know
from TV viewing and Web surfing to be non-
sense. The assumed static world of Ricardo ver-
sus the dynamics of technological change can-
not be ignored.
Students see articles such as that in Business
Week "The Nitty-Gritty: How to Do the Math"
(January 17, 2000, p. 110), which stated "Hap-
pily, about 96% of any one company's risk can
be eliminated simply by owning a diversified
portfolio ..." Such headlines can be used to ask
students why employees of a company would
be wise not to own stock in that company, or
why career specialization is risky?
In reviewing a draft of this paper. Bill Goggin
observed that a standardized test, if it is not
designed to reinforce the incorrect notion that
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there are immutable principles in economics,
would have to explore a student's understand-
ing of the underlying assumptions and what
happens to the so-called unassailable prediction
when those assumptions are not met. But since
that is not the way economics is often taught,
many students would likely fail such a test—
Catch-22!!!
8. Anderson and Engers (2002) correctly point
out that the Nash equilibrium portrayed in the
movie (all the men including Nash ignore the
blonde) is not a sustainable equilibrium
because given the strategies of the others Nash
himself could score by going for the blonde—
as pointed out by one of his male friends in the
bar. Given sufficient desirability of the blond,
no heterosexual male will be willing to let her
walk, unescorted, so any one of them could
expect to score given the strategy of the other
males.
9. In the 1970s, Tversky and Kahneman set out to
construct a theory to explain the Allais paradox
(Allais, 1953), which involves behavior that
contradicts the independence axiom and linear
probability calculations in expected utility the-
ory. The arithmetic can be demonstrated in an
introductory economics class by asking each
student to consider two situations (A and B),
each involving a choice between two gambles:
Situation A: Which do you choose—Gamble
Al orA2?
Gamble Al promises a sure win of $30;
Gamble A2 is a 80% chance to win $45
and 20% chance of $0.
Situation B: Which do you choose—Gamble
BI orB2?
Gamble BI promises a 25% chance of
winning $30,
Gamble B2 is a 20% chance to win $45.
Situation B differs from situation A only in that
one-quarter of the original probability of win-
ning a positive amount can be realized. Yet, the
majority of students typically will prefer Al to
A2 and prefer B2 to BI. Thus, the paradox is
demonstrated by actually engaging the students
in the choice process.
A von Neumann-Morgenstem utility function
and the implied preference reversal of the
Allais paradox can be demonstrated by asking
each student who said that A1 is preferred to A2
and B2 is preferred to BI to assign utility val-
ues to the two basic outcomes of wining $45 or
nothing and then to state the implied utility lim-
its for $30. For example, a student who says
u(0) = 0 and u(45) - 1.00 is implying that u(30)
= V, for 0 < V < 1. Expected utility can now be
introduced as the sum of utility outcomes
weighted by their respective probabilities:
Gamble A1 promises a sure win of $30, so EU
0(0) = v
Gamble A2 is a 80% chance to win $45, so
EU = 0.8(1) + .2(0) = 0.8
If Al is preferred to A2, then v > 0.8
Lottery BI promises a 25% chance of win-
ning $30, so EU = 0.25(v) -i-.75(0) = 0.25v
Lottery B2 is a 20% chance to win $45. so
EU=0.2(l)-H.8(0) = 0.20
If B2 is preferred to B1, then v < 0.8
Kahneman states that the apparent contradic-
tion in this implied utility is not a demonstra-
tion of stupidity but a much more interesting
issue: the susceptibility to erroneous intuitions
about uncertainty and probability.
10. Allais's problem is a demonstration that the
subjective response to probability is not neces-
sarily linear. The difference between probabili-
ties of 0.25 and 0.35 in decision-making is not
as relevant as the difference between 0 and
0.10, or between .90 and 1.00. Furthermore, via
questioning of students in the classroom, what
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) call "reflection"
and "loss aversion" can be demonstrated:
changing the signs of all outcomes in a pair of
gambles almost always caused the preference
to change from risk averse to risk seeking, or
vice versa. For example, the majority of stu-
dents in a class typically preferred a sure gain
of $900 to a .9 probability of gaining $1,000 (or
nothing), but they preferred a gamble with a .9
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probability of losing $1,000 over a sure loss of
$900.
11. For a review of alternative decision theories see
Starmer (2000). "Can people learn to be as
rational as economic theory supposes," The
Economist (Aug 30-Sept 5, 2003, p. 56.) pro-
vides an excellent discussion of some of the
research supporting behavioralists' views ver-
sus the newer research (by John List 2003) sup-
porting neoclassical theory that even introduc-
tory students can understand.
12. Surfing the Web, students will find less than
favorable critiques of textbook economics—for
example, Yoram Bauman puts the boot into
Mankiw's 10 principles of economics at
http://www.improb.com/airchives/paperair/
volume9/v9i2/mankiw.html. They will find
entire journals devoted to showing the fragility
of simplistic economics concepts—e.g., the
online Post-Autistic Economics Review started
by the French students' protest against neoclas-
sical economics http://www.paecon.net. A trip
to the library will uncover Steve Keen's (2002)
controversial book Debunking Economics: The
Naked Emperor of the Social Sciences, which
could have been more accurately titled
Debunking Textbook Economics. Keen also
maintains an extensive Website at
http://www.debunking-economics.com, as do
other controversial liberal and conservative
academic economists, such as Brad DeLong, at
University of California Berkeley,
h t t p : / / w w w . j - b r a d f o r d - d e l o n g . n e t /
movable_type/ or Tyler Cowen and Alex Tabor-
rok, at George Mason University, http://
www.marginalrevolution.com.
13. Psychologist McKeachie (1997) states: "Many
students prefer teaching that enables them to
listen passively—teaching that organizes the
subject matter for them and that prepares them
well for tests . . . research, however, points to
better retention, thinking, and motivational
effects when students are more actively
involved in talking, writing, and doing . . .
Thus, some teachers get high ratings for teach-
ing in less than ideal ways." (p. 1219)
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